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Abstract—As smart cards have become increasingly prevalent
in electronic access control systems, this paper investigates an
implementation at a national institution, which uses a smart card
with publicly known weaknesses.
The main outcome is a set of recommendations which can
be used for securing electronic access control systems against
the discovered flaws of this work: The implementation did not
follow guidelines from the manufacturer of the cards, the content
of the restricted sector was printed onto each card, and in-house
services with inherent security flaws were built around the cards,
but not maintained.
These flaws meant that the civil registration number of any
employee at the institution could be revealed. Additionally, the
flaws allowed for changing the PIN code of any card in the
system.
Index Terms—MIFARE Classic 1K, Crypto1, Smart Cards,
Electronic Access Control
I. INTRODUCTION
Electronic access control in enterprises and institutions is
widely used. In 2019, 49% of companies with more than 250
employees in Denmark used sensors for security and access
control [1].
These systems often utilise the MIFARE Classic Smart
Cards, which have had known weaknesses since 2008 [2]. This
has been seen in the Dutch OV-chipkaart (Public Transport
chipcard) used for public transport, where TNO (Netherlands
Organisation for Applied Scientific Research) predicted that
the weaknesses enable abuse and fraud [3].
More than 10 years later and MIFARE Classic is still being
used, which prompted this work. This work will examine to
what extent the smart card access control implementation at
a national institution (from now on referred to as NI) can be
exploited and the outcome will be a set of recommendations
that secures the system against the shown attacks.
The implementation at NI was created in collaboration with
a security company operating in Denmark and it allows for the















Fig. 1. Simplified representation of the smart card access control implemen-
tation at NI.
Section II will cover the known exploits in the MIFARE
Classic smart cards, which allow reading and writing of the
locked cards. In section III and IV the specific implementation
at NI will be examined.
This practical insight will form the basis of the recommen-
dations in section V.
II. BACKGROUND
The model used at NI is Role-Based Access Control
(RBAC) in order for the cards to have different permissions.
The smart cards used are MIFARE Classic 1K which are
manufactured by NXP and issued by the security company.
The MIFARE Classic 1K has 1 kB of storage which is
split between 16 sectors (0 through 15), each containing four
16 byte blocks [4]. The last sector of each block, called the
sector trailer, is dedicated to two 48 bit authentication keys,
key A and key B, alongside permission bits for each block of
that sector. These bits control the read and write permissions
of the sector blocks, alongside which keys are needed to have
these permissions.
In principle an adversary can not get access to the blocks
that are restricted by the permission bits without a correct key
[4].
However, these permission restrictions do not quite suffice
in practice:
In 2007 Nohl et al. published weaknesses of Crypto1, the
proprietary cryptographic algorithm used by the smart cards.
These weaknesses were later used to fully reverse engineer the
cryptographic algorithm [2].
The main weaknesses revolve around the insufficient size
of the keys, the insufficient randomness provided by the 16
bit Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) and the properties
of the 48 bit LSFR [2]. Therefore, adversaries can extract the
key used to encrypt secret data on a card.
III. DISSECTING SMART CARDS
NI utilises the content of sector 15 for authentication and
sector 15 is the only sector restricted by a non-zero 48 bit key.
Sector 15 will be referred to as the restricted sector.
A. Accessing the restricted sector
After investigating the known weaknesses, it became appar-
ent that all of the tested smart cards from NI share the same
key. This means if the key to a single smart card is cracked,
the key to all the smart cards is cracked, and thus the contents
of the restricted sector can be accessed.
B. Contents of the restricted Sector
Using a cracked key revealed that sector 15 is used to store
some data. An example of this can be seen in fig. 2.
Fig. 2. A cropped screen shot of MIFARE Classic Tool [5] reading a smart
card with card number 123456. This requires the sector key which has been
removed from the screenshot.
The following pattern appeared when decoding the contents




Where XXXXXX is the users’ card number and Y seemed to
vary between 0x30 and 0x3F. In this pattern, it is speculated
that this is a check digit determined by formula 1.









Where dn is the n’th digit of the card number, 6 is the
length of the card number, Y10 is the decimal representation
of the ASCII character Y and 48 is the decimal representation
of 0x30.
C. Card numbers
Since the content of sector 15 depends solely on the card
number, the security of the card is reduced to this number.
This means that an adversary with access to the global key
can duplicate cards using only a users card number.
The six digit card number might provide adequate security if
it is kept secret. However several flaws in the implementation
and usage of this number were found.
1) Card numbers are printed on the outside of cards,
making scanning unnecessary to reveal the data on the
locked sector.
2) Card numbers are used for identification, meaning they
are not kept secret by employees. For instance, card
numbers are written on pieces of paper when requesting
permission to access a room.
3) Card numbers are sequential, meaning employees can
guess other card numbers by counting up or down from
their own.
Even though these flaws allow for remote duplication of
cards, many rooms still require PIN code authentication which
greatly limits the extent to which the mentioned flaws can be
utilised. Section IV will cover these PIN codes and the services
built around them.
IV. PIN CODES
PIN codes are implemented separately from the card itself,
meaning compromising a smart card will not yield the PIN
code. The PIN code is instead fetched from a central database
every time one tries to enter. This PIN code is cached at each
building, in the case the central database is offline (see fig. 1).
It was discovered that PIN codes are four digit numbers
and must not start with a 0, which allows for 9000 different
combinations.
NI provided a number of services that made use of- or
manipulated PIN codes. As shown in the following sections,
flaws in these services could enable an adversary to extract
and/or change PIN codes. NI has addressed these flaws as a
result of this work.
A. Library Login Page
The library at NI provided a login page where employees
could login using their card number and PIN code. No rate
limiting was employed meaning PIN codes could be brute-
forced if the card number is known. Even though the server
did not employ rate limiting, it was very slow. As such, all
possible PIN code combinations could be tested in 7.5 hours
at a rate of one password every 3 seconds.
B. Set PIN Code Page
NI provided a page where employees could set their PIN
codes. To log in on this page, one had to provide a matching
Danish Civil Registration Number (CPR number) and card
number. The CPR number consists of one’s birth date with a
four digit number. The parity of the four digits represents sex.
If a person’s birth date is known, that person’s CPR number
has 540 different remaining combinations and half that if the
Fig. 3. Page enabling employees to set their PIN codes by specifying CPR
number and card number. A flaw enabled changing of PIN codes without
specifying correct CPR number.
sex is also known [6]. This enables brute-forcing the login if
the card number is known, which also reveals that person’s
personal CPR number.
It was discovered that this page had two visible endpoints
login and pin. Login redirects the user to pin if the CPR
number and card number are correct, while pin enables the
user to change the pin for the specified card number.
Unfortunately pin did not check if user is authenticated in
login, meaning PIN codes can be changed without knowing
the correct CPR number.
Because of the seemingly sequential card numbers an adver-
sary can generate valid card numbers by counting up or down
from an observed card number. This enabled changing PIN
codes and/or extracting CPR numbers from card numbers.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
NXP, the manufacturer of MIFARE Classic 1K, are aware
of some vulnerabilities hereof, and as such, has given recom-
mendations with regards to the implementation of the card.
Following these recommendations, and keeping up to date
with them, will mitigate some of the flaws. The manufacturer
recommendations are as follows:
• Avoid using MIFARE Classic – MIFARE CLASSIC 1K
cards should not be used, as it does not provide adequate
cryptographic security.
• Use unique keys – Keys should not be reused and should
be unique to each card.
Additionally, as a result of this work:
• Limit the number of PIN attempts – When verifying
with PIN, the number of allowed attempts should be rate
limited to counteract brute-force attacks.
• Do not print contents of the restricted sector, on the card
– The data on the restricted sector should preferably be
randomly generated, and not used for any other purpose.
• Do not let services remain unmaintained – Keep services
up to date with best practices and beware that these ser-
vices can compromise an access control implementation.
• Generate card numbers randomly – If card numbers are
to be used for logging in, they should be random and
more than six digits.
VI. CONCLUSION
Having examined the implementation at NI it is concluded
that several flaws exist, aside from the ones covered in section
II. They are rooted in implementation flaws of the smart cards,
and the addition of several in-house services by NI.
Collectively, these flaws allow remote duplication of smart
cards, thus granting access to locked rooms on behalf of
employees. This requires a valid card number of an employee
with access to the locked room. However, card numbers can be
guessed by counting up or down from a known card number.
Alongside remote duplication, these flaws also allow revealing
the civil registration number of any employee at the institution.
Due to these flaws several recommendations, in addition to
the manufacturer’s recommendations, were determined.
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